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Note 
 
PERRY v. NEW HAMPSHIRE: ABANDONING THE SUPREME 
COURT’S FUNDAMENTAL CONCERN WITH EYEWITNESS 
RELIABILITY 
SHAUN GATES∗ 
In Perry v. New Hampshire,1 the Supreme Court of the United 
States considered whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment2 requires preliminary judicial screenings of the reliability 
of suggestive eyewitness identifications, even when not arranged by 
police.3  The Court concluded that due process is not implicated 
when the identification is not the result of suggestive, police-arranged 
procedures.4  The majority’s focus on the presence of suggestive po-
lice arrangement in its eyewitness identification jurisprudence led it 
to incorrectly conclude that deterrence was the primary aim of the 
due process constraint on eyewitness testimony.5  The majority failed 
to recognize that the due process framework arose out of the Court’s 
reliability concerns and that the presence of police arrangement in its 
eyewitness jurisprudence, which reflects a practical reality, was only 
discussed as it affected reliability.6  The Court should have revised the 
current due process framework to better measure reliability and rec-
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 1.  132 S. Ct. 716 (2012). 
 2.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2. 
 3.  Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 723. 
 4.  Id. at 730. 
 5.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 6.  See infra Part IV.A. 
  
572 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:571 
ognized that the due process constraint is implicated in all suggestive 
circumstances.7 
I.  THE CASE 
At approximately 3:00 AM on August 15, 2008, Officer Nicole 
Clay of the Nashua Police Department responded to a call alerting 
police that a black man was attempting to gain access to multiple au-
tomobiles parked behind an apartment complex.8  When Officer Clay 
entered the parking lot in her marked police cruiser, she heard what 
sounded like an aluminum bat hit the ground.9  Officer Clay immedi-
ately noticed a black man, later identified as Barion Perry, standing 
between two automobiles.10  After Officer Clay exited her police 
cruiser, Perry began to walk toward her holding two audio amplifiers 
in his hands.11  As Perry walked towards Officer Clay, he stated that he 
had found the amplifiers lying on the ground and was “just moving 
them.”12 
Alex Clavijo, one of the residents of the apartment complex, ap-
proached Officer Clay only moments later.13  Clavijo stated that he 
owned one of the automobiles that had been broken into and further 
indicated that his neighbor, Nubia Blandon, had witnessed an indi-
vidual break into his car.14  Officer Clay asked Perry to remain with 
another officer who had arrived on scene so that she could speak with 
Clavijo’s neighbor.15  Officer Clay and Clavijo met Blandon in the 
hallway outside of her fourth-floor apartment.16  When asked to de-
scribe what she had seen, Blandon stated that she watched a tall black 
man with a baseball bat in his hand circle Clavijo’s car, open the 
                                                          
 7.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 8.  State v. Perry, No. 08-S-1797-1798, at 1 (N.H. Super. Ct. Apr. 28, 2009) (order 
denying defendant’s motions to suppress). 
 9.  Id. 
 10.  Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Id. at 2.  Perry also asserted that he saw two “kids” leaving the parking lot.  Id.  He 
walked with Officer Clay to a nearby street and identified an individual as one of the 
“kids.”  Id. 
 13.  Id. 
 14.  Id.  
 15.  Id.  
 16.  Id.; Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 721 (2012). 
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trunk of the car, and remove a large box from within.17  When Officer 
Clay asked her for a more specific description of the man, Blandon 
pointed to her window and stated that the individual standing with 
the police officer in the parking lot was the individual she had seen.18  
Perry was arrested following this conversation.19  Approximately one 
month after Perry’s arrest, the police presented Blandon with an array 
of photographs containing a picture of Perry, but she was unable to 
identify him.20 
Prior to trial in the New Hampshire Superior Court, Perry moved 
to suppress Blandon’s out-of-court identification, averring that the in-
troduction of such testimony would violate his rights to due process 
under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.21  According to Perry, 
Blandon’s identification of him was both unreliable and unnecessarily 
suggestive.22  Additionally, Perry argued that Blandon’s identification 
was inevitable because he was the only black man in the vicinity and 
was standing next to a police officer at the time.23 
Over Perry’s objection, the superior court determined that no 
due process violation would arise from admitting Blandon’s out-of-
court identification.24  Relying upon the test set forth in Neil v. Big-
                                                          
 17.  Perry, No. 08-S-1797-1798, at 2.  The large box contained audio equipment.  Id. at 2 
n.1. Clavijo acted as a translator between Officer Clay and Blandon, as Blandon spoke only 
in Spanish.  Id. at 2. 
 18.  Id. at 2–3. 
 19.  Id. at 3. 
 20.  Id. 
 21.  Id.; U.S. CONST. amend. V; id. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.  Perry also argued that the 
introduction of Blandon’s out-of-court identification would violate Part 1, Article 15 of the 
New Hampshire Constitution, which also secures the accused’s right to due process.  Perry, 
No. 08-S-1797-1798, at 3; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. 15; see also, e.g., State v. Damiano, 474 A.2d 
1045, 1047 (N.H. 1984) (stating that this article guarantees every citizen due process of 
law).  In addition to asking the court to suppress the out-of-court identification, Perry 
moved to suppress any in-court identification by Blandon.  Perry, No. 08-S-1797-1798, at 3.  
Perry argued that an in-court identification would not have a basis independent of the 
suggestive out-of-court identification.  Id.   
 22.  Perry, No. 08-S-1797-1798, at 3. 
 23.  Id. at 4.  Perry averred that the situation, in effect, constituted a “one-man show-
up.”  Id.  A show-up is an identification procedure where an officer shows a witness a single 
suspect or a single photograph of that suspect.  BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE 
INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 55 (2011). 
 24.  Perry, No. 08-S-1797-1798, at 3, 6. 
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gers25 and Manson v. Braithwaite,26 the court explained that to deter-
mine the admissibility of eyewitness identification, it must engage in a 
two-step inquiry.27  Under this test, the court must first consider 
“whether the identification procedure was unnecessarily suggestive.”28  
If the court answers this question in the affirmative, it must then and 
only then determine whether the identification was nonetheless relia-
ble.29  The court concluded that Blandon’s identification of Perry was 
not the result of suggestive, police-arranged procedures30 because 
nothing Officer Clay did caused Blandon to identify Perry.31  Finding 
no police-arranged suggestiveness, the court did not consider whether 
the identification was independently reliable.32  The court admitted 
Blandon’s out-of-court identification at trial.33  Perry was subsequently 
convicted of theft by unauthorized taking.34 
                                                          
 25.  409 U.S. 188, 199–200 (1972). 
 26.  432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).  
 27. Perry, No. 08-S-1797-1798, at 3.  The term “two-step inquiry” is not equivalent to 
“due process constraint.”  The two-step inquiry is a test used by courts to determine wheth-
er the due process constraint will prevent eyewitness identification evidence from being 
introduced.  See infra Part II.A.   
 28.  Perry, No. 08-S-1797-1798, at 3 (quoting State v. Cyr, 453 A.2d 1315, 1317 (N.H. 
1982)). 
 29.  Id. at 3–4. 
 30.  The term “police-arranged” is somewhat ambiguous in this context as it may con-
note either intention with regard to the arrangement itself (that is, the police intended to 
conduct a show-up), or intention with regard to the suggestion (that is, police intended to 
suggest that the defendant was the individual who committed a crime).  The Supreme 
Court’s majority opinion in Perry seemed to suggest that both are needed.  See infra Part III.  
This Note uses “police-arranged” to connote that police the least intentionally arranged 
the confrontation between the witness and the accused.  Therefore, “police-arranged” 
does not refer to instances where police inadvertently caused the confrontation between 
the witness and the accused.  Moreover, it does not include instances where someone oth-
er than the police arranged the circumstances, regardless of whether that person did so 
intentionally. 
 31.  Perry, No. 08-S-1797-1798, at 4. 
 32.  Id. at 5. 
 33.  Id.  The court also admitted Blandon’s in-court identification on similar grounds.  
Id. 
 34.  State v. Perry, No. 2009-0590, slip op. at 1 (N.H. Nov. 18, 2010), aff’d, Perry v. New 
Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012).  Perry was initially charged with one count of theft by 
unauthorized taking and one count of criminal mischief.  Perry, No. 08-S-1797-1798, at 1.   
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Perry appealed his conviction to the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court, contending that the admission of Blandon’s out-of-court iden-
tification violated his due process rights as secured by state and feder-
al constitutions.35  Relying on the same two-step inquiry as the lower 
court, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that no due process 
violation occurred because Blandon’s out-of-court identification was 
not the result of suggestive, police-arranged procedures.36  Because 
Perry failed to demonstrate that the identification resulted from po-
lice-arranged suggestiveness, the court did not reach the second step 
and declined to consider the reliability of the identification.37  The 
court affirmed the superior court’s denial of Perry’s motion.38 
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari to de-
termine whether the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause 
requires trial courts to conduct preliminary judicial screenings of the 
reliability of eyewitness identifications made under suggestive circum-
stances not arranged by police.39 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Since its inception, the due process framework for analyzing the 
admissibility of eyewitness testimony has gone largely unchanged in 
Supreme Court jurisprudence.40  Part II.A of this Note traces the Su-
preme Court’s development of the due process constraint.  Part II.B 
explains how, relying on the Supreme Court’s due process jurispru-
dence, state and lower federal courts have adopted divergent ap-
proaches under the due process framework, using either fairness-
based or deterrence-based rationales.  Part II.C describes how the 
New Jersey Supreme Court took a rather unique approach by revising 
the due process framework in light of emerging scientific findings 
concerning the reliability of eyewitness testimony. 
                                                          
 35.  State v. Perry, No. 2009-0590, slip op. at 1. 
 36.  Id. at 1–2. 
 37.  Id. at 2.  
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 723 (2012). 
 40.  See infra Part II.A. 
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A.  The Supreme Court Developed a Two-Part Test to Determine Whether 
Due Process Requires Suppression of Eyewitness Identification 
Evidence 
As early as 1967, the Supreme Court was aware that certain pre-
trial occurrences “might well settle the accused’s fate and reduce the 
trial itself to a mere formality.”41  The Court noted that “[t]he vagaries 
of eyewitness identification are well-known,” and recognized the vast 
number of miscarriages of justice stemming from mistaken identifica-
tions.42  Additionally, the Court recognized that state-created sugges-
tive witness identifications may have substantially contributed to this 
miscarriage.43  To prevent such miscarriages of justice, the Court, in a 
series of decisions made on the same day, recognized two constitu-
tional protections.44 
The Court in United States v. Wade45 recognized that the defend-
ant’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel46 extended to pretrial con-
frontations between the accused and adverse witnesses.47  The Court 
reasoned that it must scrutinize such confrontations “to determine 
whether the presence of . . . counsel is necessary to preserve the de-
fendant’s basic right to a fair trial as affected by his right meaningfully 
to cross-examine” adverse witnesses.48  Thus, under Wade, courts were 
to exclude identification evidence obtained in the absence of and 
                                                          
 41.  United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967). 
 42.  Id. at 228. 
 43.  Id. 
 44.  Id. at 236–37 (recognizing a Sixth Amendment right to counsel at pretrial 
lineups); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301–02 (1967) (recognizing, in addition to the 
holding in Wade, an independent due process constraint on the admissibility of eyewitness 
testimony). 
 45.  388 U.S. 218 (1967). 
 46.  U.S. CONST. amend. VI. 
 47.  Wade, 388 U.S. at 236–37.  The Wade decision was released on the same day as Gil-
bert v. California, which also dealt with a constitutional right to counsel at pretrial lineups.  
338 U.S. 263, 264–265 (1967).  
 48.  Wade, 388 U.S. at 227.  The Court was concerned that a defendant would be una-
ble to attack the credibility of a pretrial lineup if it was conducted in the absence of de-
fendant’s counsel, because a defendant on his own may not be able to demonstrate that 
the lineup procedure suggestively signaled to the witness that the defendant was the cul-
prit.  Id. at 231–32. 
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without notice to counsel, unless the identification had an independ-
ent source of reliability.49 
In addition to the exclusionary rule of Wade, the Supreme Court 
in Stovall v. Denno50 recognized a due process constraint51 on the ad-
missibility of eyewitness identifications.52  The Court explained that a 
defendant was entitled to relief when the “confrontation conduct-
ed . . . was so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable 
mistaken identification that [the defendant] was denied due process 
of law.”53  The Court explained that determining whether the con-
frontation was overly suggestive depends upon the totality of the cir-
cumstances.54  In Stovall the police brought the handcuffed defendant 
to the hospital room where a victim of the crime was recovering.55  
The Court concluded that no due process violation had occurred be-
                                                          
 49.  See id. at 236–37, 242 (finding that the lineup should not have been conducted 
without notice to and the presence of counsel, and remanding the case to the District 
Court to determine whether the witness’s in-court identification of Wade had an inde-
pendent source).  To determine whether an identification had an independent source, 
the Court explained that it ought to consider: 
[T]he prior opportunity to observe the alleged criminal act, the existence of any 
discrepancy between any pre-lineup description and the defendant’s actual de-
scription, any identification prior to lineup of another person, the identification 
by picture of the defendant prior to the lineup, failure to identify the defendant 
on a prior occasion, and the lapse of time between the alleged act and the lineup 
identification. 
Id. at 241. 
 50.  388 U.S. 293 (1967). 
 51.  The Court indicated that the due process constraint was tied to Fourteenth 
Amendment rights rather than Fifth Amendment rights by referencing Palmer v. Peyton, 
359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966).  Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302; see Palmer, 359 F.2d at 200 (consider-
ing whether a voice identification procedure violated the defendant’s Fourteenth 
Amendment due process rights). 
 52.  Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301–02.  Although this is the first Supreme Court case recogniz-
ing the constraint, the Court stated that “[t]his is a recognized ground of attack upon a 
conviction independent of any right to counsel claim.”  Id. at 302. 
 53.  Id. at 301–02.  
 54.  Id. at 302. 
 55.  Id. at 295.  The defendant was also the only black man present in the hospital 
room.  Id.   
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cause the confrontation was imperative given the victim’s critical con-
dition.56 
In Simmons v. United States,57 the Court again had occasion to con-
sider an alleged due process violation, this time in the context of an 
in-court identification following a pretrial identification by photo-
graph.58  The Court explained that in-court identifications following 
pretrial identification procedures would be deemed inadmissible only 
if the underlying identification procedure was “so impermissibly sug-
gestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification.”59  Consistent with the Court’s language in Stovall, it 
explained that “each case must be considered on its own facts.”60  The 
Court again found that, under the specific facts of the case, no due 
process violation had occurred.61  According to the Court, the photo-
graphic identification procedure used was necessary for law enforce-
ment and, given that the witnesses saw the assailants for up to five 
minutes under good lighting conditions, the identifications were like-
ly reliable.62 
Although the Stovall Court initially recognized a due process con-
straint tied to the admissibility of eyewitness testimony,63 the Supreme 
Court did not have occasion to overturn a decision based on a viola-
                                                          
 56.  Id. at 302.  The Court concluded that the show-up was imperative because the vic-
tim was the only individual who could exonerate the defendant, and she might have died 
in the hospital.  Id. 
 57.  390 U.S. 377 (1968). 
 58.  Id. at 381. 
 59.  Id. at 384. 
 60.  Id.; cf. Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967) (concluding that each alleged 
due process violation case “depends on the totality of the circumstances”). 
 61.  Simmons, 390 U.S. at 386. 
 62.  Id. at 384–85.  The Court explained that the procedure was necessary because the 
FBI needed to develop leads as quickly as possible.  Id. at 385.  The Court indicated that its 
approach accorded with Stovall.  Id. at 384.  Yet, “[t]he inquiry mandated by Simmons is 
similar to the independent-source test used in Wade where an in-court identification is 
sought following an uncounseled lineup.”  Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 122 (1977) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting).  In both cases, the issue was whether the witness identified the 
defendant solely on the basis of his memory of events at the time of the crime, or whether 
he was merely remembering the person he picked out in a pretrial procedure.”  Simmons, 
390 U.S. at 383–84; Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 122. 
 63.  Stovall, 388 U.S. at 301–02. 
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tion of that constraint until Foster v. California.64  Unlike Stovall and 
Simmons, “this case present[ed the Court with] a compelling example 
of unfair lineup procedures.”65  In this instance, police first arranged 
a lineup in which the defendant stood out physically from the other 
individuals.66  Moreover, while the witness thought the defendant was 
among the individuals he had seen, the witness was unsure.67  The po-
lice then arranged a one-on-one confrontation between the defend-
ant and the witness.68  The witness, however, remained uncertain as to 
whether the defendant was one of the individuals he had seen.69  Only 
after arranging a second lineup, in which the defendant was the only 
person who had been in the first lineup, was the witness confident in 
his identification.70  Explaining that the “suggestive elements in this 
identification procedure made it all but inevitable that” the witness 
would identify the defendant, the Court concluded that “[t]his pro-
cedure so undermined the reliability of the eyewitness identification 
as to violate due process.”71 
The Court held, once again, that the admission of an in-court 
identification following a pretrial identification procedure did not 
give rise to likely misidentification of a defendant in Coleman v. Ala-
bama.72  In this instance, the witness claimed to have “got a real good 
look” at his assailants “in the car lights” of a passing car.73  The wit-
ness, however, gave only a vague and factually incorrect description of 
his assailants prior to the pretrial lineup conducted by police.74  When 
                                                          
 64.  394 U.S. 440, 443–44 (1969). 
 65.  Id. at 442. 
 66.  Id. at 441.  The defendant, who was nearly six feet tall, stood next to two other 
men who were nearly half a foot shorter.  Id.  The defendant also wore a leather jacket sim-
ilar to that allegedly worn by the perpetrator.  Id. 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id. at 441–42. 
 71.  Id. at 443.  According to the Court’s later evaluation of Foster in Biggers, the basis of 
the exclusion was the “likelihood of misidentification.”  Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 
(1972). 
 72.  399 U.S. 1, 5 (1970). 
 73.  Id. at 4. 
 74.  Id.  The witness claimed that the assailants were “young, black males, close to the 
same age and height.”  Id.  Although both defendants were black, there was an age differ-
ence of approximately ten years and a height difference of nearly a foot.  Id. 
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the police arranged a lineup, the witness, before the lineup even be-
gan, unequivocally identified the defendants as his assailants.75  Alt-
hough one of the defendants was the only individual in the pretrial 
lineup wearing a hat, and the witness was previously unable to de-
scribe his assailants with certainty, the Court concluded that the in-
court identification “did not stem from an identification procedure at 
the lineup ‘so impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very sub-
stantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.’”76  To the contra-
ry, the Court found that the facts supported the contention that the 
in-court identification was “entirely based upon observations at the 
time of the” incident.77 
The Court, in Neil v. Biggers,78 made clear that unnecessary sug-
gestiveness alone does not mandate the exclusion of identification ev-
idence.79  Rather, the Court developed a two-step test explaining that 
if it first determined that the identification procedure was suggestive, 
it must then consider “whether under the ‘totality of the circumstanc-
es’ the identification was [nonetheless] reliable.”80  The Court noted,  
the factors to be considered in evaluating the likelihood of 
misidentification include the opportunity of the witness to 
view the criminal at the time of the crime, the witness’ de-
gree of attention, the accuracy of the witness’ prior descrip-
tion of the criminal, the level of certainty demonstrated by 
the witness at the confrontation, and the length of time be-
tween the crime and the confrontation.81 
The Court explained that “[i]t is the likelihood of misidentifica-
tion which violates a defendant’s right to due process.”82  Basing its 
decision on an application of the reliability factors it outlined, the 
                                                          
 75.  Id. at 5. 
 76.  Id. at 4–6 (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 384 (1968)).  There 
was no indication that law enforcement required the defendant to wear a hat.  Id. at 6. 
 77.  Id. at 5–6. 
 78.  409 U.S. 188 (1972). 
 79.  Id. at 199. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. at 199–200. 
 82.  Id. at 198.  Accordingly, “the primary evil to be avoided is ‘a very substantial likeli-
hood of irreparable misidentification.’”  Id. (quoting Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 
377, 384 (1968)). 
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Court concluded that no due process violation occurred as a result of 
a show-up conducted by police.83 
The Supreme Court reaffirmed the Biggers two-step test in Man-
son v. Brathwaite.84  The first step, the Court explained, was to deter-
mine “whether the police used an impermissibly suggestive procedure 
in obtaining the out-of-court identification.”85  If a court answers this 
in the affirmative, it must then determine “whether, under all the cir-
cumstances, that suggestive procedure gave rise to a substantial likeli-
hood of irreparable misidentification.”86  The Court explained that 
the basis for excluding identifications made under suggestive circum-
stances was a “concern that the jury not hear eyewitness testimony un-
less that evidence has aspects of reliability.”87  As a result, the Court 
concluded that “reliability is the linchpin” of whether eyewitness iden-
tifications are admissible.88 
B.  Following the Supreme Court’s Eyewitness Jurisprudence, State and 
Lower Federal Courts Diverged Between Fairness-Based and 
Deterrence-Based Approaches 
Looking to the Supreme Court’s decisions in Stovall and its prog-
eny, lower federal and state courts are to consider whether, under the 
totality of the circumstances, the identification procedure was so sug-
gestive as to fatally taint the reliability of the resulting identification.89  
Although in each of the Supreme Court’s cases the suggestive circum-
stances were in some way arranged by police, the Court did not indi-
cate whether the police arrangement was essential or incidental to its 
holdings.90  This failure resulted in divergent application of the due 
process framework.91  Some state and lower federal courts cast the jus-
                                                          
 83.  Id. at 200–01. 
 84.  432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977). 
 85.  Id. at 107. 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. at 112. 
 88.  Id. at 114.  Judged by the factors set forth in Biggers, the Court concluded that the 
introduction of eyewitness testimony pertaining to a pretrial identification by a single-
photograph display did not violate the defendant’s due process rights.  Id. at 114–17. 
 89.  See supra Part II.A. 
 90.  See supra Part II.A. 
 91.  Compare Thigpen v. Cory, 804 F.2d 893, 895 (6th Cir. 1986) (determining that the 
“deterrence of police misconduct [was] not the basic purpose for excluding identification 
evidence”), with State v. Pailon, 590 A.2d 858, 860 (R.I. 1991) (“There seems little doubt 
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tification for the due process constraint as a concern with reliability of 
eyewitness testimony.92  As a result, these jurisdictions have reasoned 
that the framework is applicable to instances where the suggestive cir-
cumstances were unintentionally arranged by law enforcement and 
where there was a complete absence of police arrangement.93  By con-
trast, most state and lower federal courts interpret the constraint as 
supported by a deterrence rationale.94  Accordingly, these jurisdic-
tions refuse to apply the constraint to instances where the suggestive-
ness is not police-arranged.95 
1.  A Minority of Jurisdictions, Citing the Reliability Rationale, Apply 
the Due Process Framework to Any Suggestive Circumstances, 
Regardless of Whether Police Arranged Them 
Basing their decisions on the constraint’s concern with securing 
reliable eyewitness evidence, some state and federal jurisdictions have 
reasoned that the constraint applies to suggestive circumstances irre-
spective of whether police arranged the circumstances intentionally.96  
For example, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit, in Green v. Loggins,97 explained that “a court is obligated to review 
every pre-trial encounter [under the due process framework], accidental 
or otherwise, in order to insure that the circumstances of the particu-
lar encounter have not been so suggestive as to undermine the relia-
bility of the . . . identification.”98  In Green, the police accidentally 
placed the defendant in the same holding cell as an eyewitness seek-
                                                          
that the Court’s exclusionary rule relating to evidence obtained in violation of [due pro-
cess] was directed entirely at the deterrence of illegal police procedures . . . .”). 
 92.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
 93.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
 94.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
 95.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
 96.  See, e.g., United States v. Bouthot, 878 F.2d 1506, 1516 (1st Cir. 1989) (“Because 
the due process focus in the identification context is on the fairness of the trial and not 
exclusively on police deterrence, it follows that federal courts should scrutinize all sugges-
tive identification procedures, not just those orchestrated by the police . . . .”); Thigpen, 
804 F.2d at 895 (holding that the presence of state action was not necessary in order to 
review admissibility); Green v. Loggins, 614 F.2d 219, 223 (9th Cir. 1980) (“[A] court is 
obligated to review every pre-trial encounter, accidental or otherwise . . . .”). 
 97.  614 F. 2d 219 (9th Cir. 1980). 
 98.  Id. at 223 (emphasis added). 
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ing protective custody.99  The witness “did not appear to recognize 
[the defendant] until . . . a booking officer asked both [the witness] 
and [the defendant] to identify themselves.”100  The State maintained 
that this encounter was above constitutional due process review be-
cause it would serve no deterrent purpose.101  The court, however, 
expressly rejected the notion that deterrence was a fundamental pur-
pose of the constraint.102  Rather, the court explained that the due 
process constraint serves to ensure reliability.103 
Adopting the reasoning set forth in Green, the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, in Thigpen v. Cory,104 agreed 
that due process requires courts to review suggestive circumstances 
even when there is no police arrangement.105  The court reiterated 
that “deterrence of police misconduct is not the basic purpose for ex-
cluding identification evidence.”106  Basing its reasoning on the Su-
preme Court’s language in Biggers, the court explained that “only the 
effects of, rather than the causes for” a pretrial encounter are deter-
minative of whether the identification was irreparably suggestive.107 
                                                          
 99.  Id. at 221. 
 100.  Id. at 222. 
 101.  Id.  If the suggestion is the result of unintentional conduct, the conduct cannot be 
deterred because unintentional acts, by their very nature, cannot be prevented. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id.  The court found that the admission of the witness’s in-court identification 
lacked the requisite reliability, and that its admission was not harmless error.  Id. at 225. 
 104.  804 F.2d 893 (6th Cir. 1986). 
 105.  Id. at 895.  In this case, the witness, who had been robbed by two men, encoun-
tered the defendant on three separate occasions.  Id. at 894–95.  First, although the de-
fendant appeared in a pretrial lineup, the witness only identified another man, who hap-
pened to be the defendant’s brother.  Id. at 894.  Second, the witness saw the defendant 
once again at the brother’s preliminary hearing.  Id. at 895.  Last, the witness saw the de-
fendant at the brother’s trial, where the defendant at one point sat next to the witness.  Id.  
It was only at the trial that the witness told law enforcement that he recognized the de-
fendant as the other assailant.  Id. 
 106.  Id. 
 107.  Id. at 895.  The court concluded that the defendant’s due process rights were vio-
lated as a result of the admission of the witness’ identification testimony.  Id. at 898.  See 
also Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972) (“It is the likelihood of misidentification 
which violates a defendant’s right to due process . . . .”). 
  
584 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:571 
2.  Most Jurisdictions, Citing a  Deterrence Rationale, Apply the Due 
Process Framework Only to Instances Involving Police Arrangement 
Most federal and state jurisdictions recognize the due process 
framework’s deterrent purpose and, as a result, restrict its application 
to instances involving police-arranged confrontations.108  For exam-
ple, the Third Circuit, in United States v. Zeiler,109 reasoned that the 
due process framework was not applicable “[w]hen . . . there [wa]s no 
evidence that law enforcement officials encouraged or assisted in im-
permissive identification procedures.”110  Finding no evidence sug-
gesting that “the pretrial publicity [identifying the defendant as the 
culprit] was controlled or directed by law enforcement,” the court 
concluded that the eyewitness made a competent identification of the 
defendant.111  Reasoning that the Supreme Court’s Wade and Simmons 
decisions “were concerned with the conduct of law enforcement offi-
cials,” the court found that eyewitness testimony should be admitted 
when law enforcement did not participate in the identification proce-
dure.112 
The Supreme Court of Rhode Island, in State v. Pailon,113 ex-
plained that suggestive circumstances caused by private individuals 
did not invoke the protections of the due process constraint.114  In 
Pailon, a citizen approached the witness, who had been assaulted and 
robbed while working at her jewelry store, and told her the names of 
                                                          
 108.  See, e.g., State v. Holliman, 570 A.2d 680, 684 (Conn. 1990) (“[I]t is well estab-
lished that conduct that may fairly be characterized as state action is a necessary predicate 
to a challenge under the due process clause . . . .”); Wilson v. Commonwealth, 695 S.W.2d 
854, 857 (Ky. 1985) (“Implicit in the first prong of the Biggers test is a finding that the gov-
ernment had some hand in arranging the confrontation.”); State v. Birch, 41,979, p. 7 (La. 
App. 2 Cir. 5/9/07), 956 So.2d 793, 800 (holding that due process is not implicated unless 
there is a showing of state action); State v. Pailon, 590 A.2d 858, 863 (R.I. 1991) (“[A]bsent 
state action, no constitutional violation that would give rise to the creation of an exclu-
sionary rule has been committed.”). 
 109.  470 F.2d 717 (3d Cir. 1972). 
 110.  Id. at 720. 
 111.  Id. at 718–19. 
 112.  Id. at 720.  The court reasoned that excluding eyewitness testimony based on pre-
trial publicity would impose an untenable duty on law enforcement to prevent news 
sources from publishing photographs of arrested individuals.  Id. 
 113.  590 A.2d 858 (R.I. 1991). 
 114.  Id. at 861. 
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the men who had robbed her.115  When the citizen brought the victim 
a photograph of the defendant, the victim “instantly” identified the 
man in the photograph as her assailant.116  In determining whether to 
apply the due process framework, the court noted that “[t]here seems 
little doubt that the [Supreme] Court’s exclusionary rule . . . was di-
rected entirely at the deterrence of illegal police procedures.”117  The 
court supported its statement by noting that in every case in the Su-
preme Court’s eyewitness jurisprudence, the “offending conduct . . . 
was carried out by governmental rather than private action.”118  Be-
cause the conduct at issue in this case was carried out by private indi-
viduals, the court determined that it need not apply the due process 
framework as no constitutional violation occurred in the admission of 
the eyewitness’s identification.119 
C.  The New Jersey Supreme Court Revised Its Due Process Framework in 
Response to the Significant Doubt That Developments in Social Science 
Cast on the Reliability of Eyewitness Testimony 
Recognizing that developments in social science have cast doubt 
upon the long-standing due process framework, the New Jersey Su-
preme Court in State v. Henderson120 revised its test for evaluating the 
reliability of an eyewitness’s identification.121  The court pointed to 
recent research, which it thought convincingly demonstrated that 
commonly held notions about the reliability of human memory are 
oversimplified.122  The current test for evaluating eyewitness identifi-
                                                          
 115.  Id. at 859–60.  The citizen claimed to know who had robbed her because the same 
individuals had also robbed his mother.  Id. at 860. 
 116.  Id.  The victim turned the photograph over to a security guard employed at the 
store, who in turn gave it to the police department.  Id.  The police arranged a lineup 
some time later and the victim, after several minutes of studying the individuals in the 
lineup, identified the defendant.  Id.  Although it took her several minutes to make this 
identification, the victim testified that she recognized the defendant instantly but wanted 
to be sure of her identification.  Id. 
 117.  Id. 
 118.  Id. at 861–62.  
 119.  Id. at 863. 
 120.  27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011). 
 121.  Id. at 877–78.  
 122.  Id. at 894. 
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cations,123 the court explained, neither accurately measures reliability 
nor sufficiently deters police misconduct.124  To remedy the test’s 
shortcomings, the court proposed a revised due process framework 
that would require courts to first consider both “system and estimator 
variables” and second to redevelop jury instructions to help jurors ac-
curately assess the value of eyewitness testimony.125 
To begin, the court noted the substantial evidence suggesting 
that eyewitness identifications are perhaps the most unreliable form 
of evidence used in criminal cases.126  The substantial number of eye-
witness misidentifications, the court explained, “stem from the fact 
that human memory is malleable.”127  According to the court, scien-
tific research demonstrates “that an array of variables can affect and 
dilute memory and lead to misidentifications.”128  These variables are 
divided into two subcategories: (1) system variables, and (2) estimator 
variables.129  System variables are those “which are within the control 
of the criminal justice system.”130  In contrast, “estimator variables are 
factors beyond the control of the criminal justice system,” for exam-
ple, stress and race bias.131  Both sets of factors, however, “can alter 
memory and affect eyewitness identifications.”132 
The court explained that the current framework for identifying 
due process violations based on suggestive police procedures that was 
set out in Brathwaite inadequately addressed reliability and did not suf-
                                                          
 123.  The current test is the approach adopted by the Supreme Court in Manson v. 
Brathwaite.  Id. at 889; see also supra Part II.A. 
 124.  Henderson, 27 A.3d at 918. 
 125.  Id. at 919 (emphasis omitted).  For a discussion of system and estimator variables, 
see infra notes 129–131 and accompanying text. 
 126.  Id. at 885–86. 
 127.  Id. at 888. 
 128.  Id. at 895. 
 129.  Id. 
 130.  Id.  The court listed several system variables, including blind administration, pre-
identification instructions, lineup construction, avoiding feedback and recording confi-
dence, and multiple viewings.  Id. at 896–901.  It also noted that its list of system variables 
was non-exhaustive and was expected to expand in light of scientific research.  Id. at 922. 
 131.  Id. at 904.  Other estimator variables include weapon focus, duration of observa-
tion, distance and lighting, witness characteristics, characteristics of the perpetrator, 
memory decay, and the conduct of private actors.  Id. at 904–09. 
 132.  Id. at 922. 
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ficiently deter inappropriate police conduct.133  According to the 
court, the Brathwaite framework ignores the effect that estimator vari-
able can have on reliability in the absence of suggestive police ar-
rangement.134  Furthermore, some of the Brathwaite test relies in part 
on the eyewitnesses to self-report, but the suggestive procedures and 
circumstances themselves can adversely affect this self-reporting.135  
The court noted that the Brathwaite approach also has the rather per-
verse effect of rewarding police suggestiveness.136  According to the 
New Jersey court, the more suggestive the procedures employed, the 
more likely the witness is to both appear confident in his assertions 
and self-report better viewing opportunities.137 
To better account for reliability and provide for more meaning-
ful deterrence, the court proposed a revised framework.138  The New 
Jersey court explained that if a defendant can show suggestiveness 
tied to a system variable,139 then a court should explore all relevant 
system and estimator variables at a pretrial hearing.140  In this situa-
tion, although the state must proffer evidence demonstrating that the 
identification is reliable and accounts for both system and estimator 
variables, “the ultimate burden remains on the defendant to prove a 
very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”141  The 
court explained that “broader [pretrial] hearings will provide more 
meaningful deterrence [and] will address reliability with greater care 
and better reflect how memory works.”142 
In some regards, the New Jersey test is similar to that of deter-
rence-based approaches in that it restricts pretrial hearings to in-
stances involving police.143  What makes this approach distinct, how-
ever, is partly its recognition that courts need to rethink the variables 
                                                          
 133.  Id. at 918. 
 134.  Id. 
 135.  Id. 
 136.  Id. 
 137.  Id. 
 138.  Id. at 919. 
 139.  A system variable is within the control of the criminal justice system.  See supra note 
130. 
 140.  Id. at 919–20. 
 141.  Id. at 920  
 142.  Id. at 922. 
 143.  See id. at 920 (requiring that the initial showing of suggestiveness come from a sys-
tem, or a criminal-justice-system-controlled, variable); see also infra Part II.B.2. 
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that affect reliability, including variables that are not within the con-
trol of law enforcement.144 
Additionally, the New Jersey court suggested that courts use re-
vised jury instructions to help jurors weigh the value of eyewitness tes-
timony.145  According to the court, jurors have an incomplete under-
standing of how memory works. Although “[e]veryone knows . . . that 
bad lighting conditions make it more difficult to perceive the details 
of a person’s face,” jurors generally lack knowledge of how many of 
the system and estimator variables affect memory and therefore relia-
bility.146  Thus, the court called for revised jury instructions to better 
explain the effects both system and estimator variables have on the re-
liability of eyewitness identification.147 
The court’s approach, driven in part by advances social science, 
revised the manner in which New Jersey courts measure reliability and 
aimed to provide jurors with a foundation to weigh eyewitness testi-
mony.148  Although this approach restricted pretrial review of eyewit-
ness identifications to instances involving police conduct, it rethought 
how police conduct may affect reliability.149  Furthermore, the court’s 
directive to revise jury instructions was motivated by a desire to give 
jurors a better platform from which to evaluate eyewitness testimony 
by providing them with an enhanced understanding of how memory 
works.150 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Perry v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court affirmed the judg-
ment of the New Hampshire Supreme Court, concluding that the 
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not require 
courts to conduct preliminary judicial screenings of the reliability of 
                                                          
 144.   See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 919 (advocating for consideration of system and estima-
tor variables).  For examples of the factors law enforcement control, see supra note 130. 
 145.  Henderson, 27 A.3d at 919.  The court referred the task of revising jury instructions 
to two state committees.  Id. at 925. 
 146.  Id. at 910.  The jury instructions used in this case, for example, did not mention 
that a witness’s level of certainty might be affected by the construction of the lineup.  See 
id. at 882–83 (excerpting the model jury instructions given at trial). 
 147.  Id. at 925–26. 
 148.  Id. at 919. 
 149.  Id. at 896–903, 920.  A more thorough pretrial hearing will also provide for more 
meaningful deterrence.  Id. at 922. 
 150.  Id. at 911, 919. 
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eyewitness identifications where there is an absence of police-
arranged suggestiveness.151  Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg 
noted that the Court has recognized and applied the due process 
constrain when an identification was procured through suggestive, 
police-arranged circumstances.152  Reasoning that police arrangement 
was essential to the decisions in the Court’s eyewitness identification 
jurisprudence, the majority explained that the framework had not, 
and would not, be extended to include suggestive circumstances not 
arranged by police.153  The majority was concerned that expanding 
the application of the due process framework would overburden low-
er federal and state courts, particularly with regard to pretrial screen-
ings.154  This practical concern aside, the majority also was mindful of 
the fact that determining the weight of eyewitness testimony fell with-
in the purview of the jury.155  Furthermore, the majority recognized 
that a defendant is protected from the effects of unreliable eyewitness 
testimony by certain federal and state laws.156 
Summarizing its eyewitness identification jurisprudence, the ma-
jority explained that the Court has tied the due process constraint on 
the admissibility of eyewitness testimony to suggestive, police-arranged 
circumstances.157  The Court, however, asserted that a showing of po-
lice-arranged suggestiveness in the procurement of an eyewitness’s 
identification does not itself mandate exclusion.158  Rather courts 
must consider whether, in light of the surrounding circumstances, the 
identification was nonetheless reliable.159  That is, due process oper-
ates “[o]nly when evidence is so extremely unfair that its admission 
violates fundamental conceptions of justice.”160 
Noting that the decisions of prior eyewitness admissibility cases 
“turn[ed] on the presence of state action and aim[ed] to deter police 
from rigging identification procedures,” the majority explained that 
                                                          
 151.  Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 730 (2012). 
 152.  Id. at 720. 
 153.  Id. at 720–21. 
 154.  Id. at 727. 
 155.  Id. at 720. 
 156.  Id. 
 157.  Id. at 723–25. 
 158.  Id. at 724. 
 159.  Id. at 724–25. 
 160.  Id. at 723 (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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police-arranged suggestiveness was a necessary predicate to the appli-
cation of the due process framework.161  The Court reasoned that it 
had not, and would not expand the scope of the constraint to include 
all suggestive circumstances because the deterrence rationale would 
be wholly irrelevant in the absence of improper police conduct.162 
After criticizing the reasoning of Perry and the dissent, both of 
which argued that police arrangement was not essential for a show-up 
to violate due process, the majority expressed an additional concern 
that expanding the scope of the process protections would overbur-
den the judicial system.163  The Court recognized that most, if not all, 
identifications involve some degree of suggestion.164  As a result, if the 
scope of due process was enlarged to include all suggestive circum-
stances, then courts would be forced into holding pretrial hearings on 
a routine basis.165 
The Court’s unwillingness to enlarge the scope of the due pro-
cess protections rested largely on its recognition that the jury’s role is 
to determine the weight of evidence.166  Furthermore, the Court rec-
                                                          
 161.  Id. at 720–21.  The majority supported this conclusion by reference to three cases 
in its eyewitness identification jurisprudence: Brathwaite, Coleman, and Wade.  Id. at 725–27.  
According to the majority, Brathwaite stands for the proposition that no due process con-
cern arises unless there are suggestive, police-arranged circumstances.  Id. at 726.  The ma-
jority explained that deterrence was a fundamental aim of the Brathwaite Court’s decision.  
Id.; see Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112 (1977) (“The second factor [motivating ex-
clusion] is deterrence.”).  The majority also pointed to Coleman, explaining that “[n]o due 
process violation occurred [in that case] because nothing ‘the police said or did prompt-
ed’” the identification. Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 726 (quoting Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 6 
(1970)).  The majority also supported its conclusion with the language of Wade, reasoning 
that the Court in that case was responding to the dangers of “police rigging” when it rec-
ognized the defendant’s right to counsel at pretrial lineups.  Id. at 726–27; see United 
States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) (“A major factor contributing to the high inci-
dence of miscarriage of justice from mistaken identification has been the degree of sug-
gestion inherent in the manner in which the prosecution presents the suspect to witnesses for 
pretrial identification.” (emphasis added)).  The Court also noted that all the cases in its 
eyewitness identification jurisprudence involved suggestive procedures that were arranged 
by police.  Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 721 n.1. 
 162.  See id. at 720–21 (noting that the deterrence rationale is the driving force behind 
the constraint). 
 163.  Id. at 727. 
 164.  Id. 
 165.  Id. 
 166.  Id. at 728. 
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ognized that federal and state safeguards protect a defendant against 
the effects of dubious eyewitness testimony by affording the defend-
ant other means to persuade the jury.167  Among these safeguards are 
the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to confront an adverse wit-
ness, Sixth Amendment right to counsel, eyewitness-specific jury in-
structions, and state and federal rules of evidence.168  These safe-
guards, the Court explained, caution jurors against the hazards of 
eyewitness testimony, allowing them to better evaluate the weight of 
such evidence.169  The Court concluded that, in the absence of police-
arranged suggestiveness, these safeguards suffice to challenge the re-
liability of eyewitness testimony.170  Finding no suggestive, police-
arranged circumstances and that the trial-level safeguards it had out-
lined were successfully applied, the Court affirmed the decision of the 
New Hampshire Supreme Court and concluded that no due process 
violation occurred as a result of the admission of Blandon’s identifica-
tion testimony.171 
In a separate concurring opinion, Justice Thomas argued that 
Stovall v. Denno and its progeny were incorrectly decided and there-
fore should not be extended to the case at hand.172  Justice Thomas 
explained that the aforementioned cases were “premised on a sub-
stantive due process right to fundamental fairness.”173  According to 
Justice Thomas, however, the Fourteenth Amendment “is not a secret 
repository of substantive guarantees against unfairness.”174  Although 
he ultimately agreed with the majority that due process extends only 
to cases involving suggestive, police-arranged procedures, he would 
limit the majority’s use of Stovall and its progeny to their specific 
facts.175 
Justice Sotomayor, in dissent, argued that the majority incorrectly 
determined that the due process constraint extends only to cases in-
volving suggestive, police-arranged circumstances.176  The majority, in 
                                                          
 167.  Id. at 728–29. 
 168.  Id.; see, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 403; N.H. R. EVID. 403 (2011). 
 169.  Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 728–29 (2012). 
 170.  Id. at 721. 
 171.  Id. at 726, 730.  
 172.  Id. at 730 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 173.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 174.  Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. at 731 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
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Justice Sotomayor’s view, mistakenly identified deterrence as the pri-
mary aim underlying due process.177  In contrast, Justice Sotomayor 
maintained that the driving force behind Wade and Stovall was the de-
sire to ensure that the jury heard only reliable evidence.178  Sotomayor 
argued that the due process issue raised in previous eyewitness identi-
fication cases lay in the negative effects suggestion had on the fairness 
of a trial, and not, as the majority suggested, in the act of suggestion 
itself.179 
Justice Sotomayor worried that the majority had fashioned a new 
and substantial limitation on a long-standing due process protection 
by restricting its application to instances involving police-arranged 
suggestion.180  According to Justice Sotomayor, the majority did not 
hold simply that identifications must arise out of the conduct of po-
lice to trigger the due process constraint, but rather that the sugges-
tive circumstances must be police-arranged.181  By requiring that the 
suggestion itself be intentionally police-arranged, Justice Sotomayor 
argued that the majority had attached a mens rea requirement onto 
the due process analysis.182  Justice Sotomayor argued that this new 
approach fails to recognize that intentional- and inadvertent-police 
suggestion result in the same due process concern: the increased like-
lihood of misidentification.183  As a result, Justice Sotomayor argued 
that due process is equally applicable in these instances.184 
Justice Sotomayor also challenged the majority’s assumption that 
enlarging the scope of due process would entail a practical burden on 
the courts.185  The defendant, Justice Sotomayor explained, still car-
ries the burden of demonstrating the overly suggestive circumstanc-
                                                          
 177.  Id. 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id. 
 180.  Id. at 733. 
 181.  Id. at 734.  Justice Sotomayor alternatively described such circumstances as “police-
rigg[ed], police-designed, or police-organized.”  Id.  (alteration in original) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted). 
 182.  Id.  As Justice Sotomayor explained, under the majority’s approach, the intent of 
law enforcement is controlling.  Id. 
 183.  Id. at 731–32. 
 184.  Id. at 735.  Justice Sotomayor did not address whether due process protections 
should apply to suggestive circumstances in which there is an absence of police action.  Id. 
at 731 n.1. 
 185.  Id. at 737. 
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es.186  And, as she pointed out, the Court has “set a high bar for sup-
pression” of eyewitness identification.187  Furthermore, because a de-
fendant may rely upon evidentiary rules and raise objections at or be-
fore trial, courts are already required to entertain objections about 
admitting eyewitness evidence.188  Finally, Justice Sotomayor pointed 
out that there has been no flood of claims in jurisdictions that apply 
due process protections to all suggestive circumstance, thus the ma-
jority’s concern that expanding the scope of the constraint would sig-
nificantly overburden the courts was unfounded.189 
The majority’s reliance on the jury to ultimately weigh eyewitness 
testimony was not persuasive, according to Justice Sotomayor.190  Ju-
rors, as she pointed out, are easily swayed by the testimony of an eye-
witness.191  Furthermore, scientific literature suggests that the jurors’ 
ability to weigh testimony is severely complicated by a witness’s false 
sense of confidence, which is inflated by suggestiveness.192  These 
concerns aside, Justice Sotomayor pointed out that the majority’s reli-
ance on jurors to weigh eyewitness testimony was an argument that 
had appeared in dissent after dissent in previous decisions.193  Those 
arguments ultimately failed, and Justice Sotomayor saw no need to re-
vive them in the instant case.194 
While there may have been reasons why the identification evi-
dence in Perry’s case was in fact reliable, Justice Sotomayor explained 
that the Court’s new approach meant that those reasons would never 
be examined.195  Justice Sotomayor concluded that the majority’s fail-
                                                          
 186.  Id. 
 187.  Id. 
 188.  Id. 
 189.  Id. at 737–38. 
 190.  Id. at 737. 
 191.  Id. 
 192.  Id. at 738–39. 
 193.  Id. at 737; see, e.g., Foster v. California, 394 U.S. 440, 447 (1969) (Black, J., dissent-
ing) (“[T]he jury must . . . be allowed to hear eyewitnesses and decide for itself whether it 
can recognize the truth and whether they are telling the truth.”); Simmons v. United 
States, 390 U.S. 377, 395 (1968) (Black, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) 
(“The weight of the evidence . . . is not a question for the Court but for the jury . . . .”). 
 194.  Perry, 132 S. Ct. at  737  (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 195.  Id. at 739. 
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ure to assess the reliability of Blandon’s testimony was wrong and that 
the case should be remanded.196 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
In Perry v. New Hampshire, the Supreme Court determined that 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not re-
quire courts to conduct preliminary judicial screenings of the reliabil-
ity of an eyewitness identification when the identification was not the 
result of suggestive, police-arranged procedures.197  The majority in 
Perry erred in identifying deterrence as a fundamental aim of the due 
process constraint.198  As Justice Sotomayor pointed out in dissent, 
due process protections arose out of a concern for ensuring the relia-
bility of an eyewitness identification.199  The majority misinterpreted 
its own eyewitness jurisprudence by concluding that deterrence was 
fundamental to these decisions and by improperly relying on the fact 
that such cases happened to involve police arrangement.200  Given the 
significant scientific doubt cast upon the reliability of eyewitness tes-
timony, the Court should have reevaluated the manner in which it 
measures reliability, much like the New Jersey Supreme Court did.201  
The Court’s approach, however, ought to be more expansive than 
that of New Jersey, and should apply the revised due process frame-
work to all suggestive circumstances.202 
                                                          
 196.  Id. at 740.  Justice Sotomayor did not offer her opinion on whether Blandon’s 
identification of Perry was reliable.  Id. at 739. 
 197.  Id. at 730 (majority opinion). 
 198.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 199.  Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 735 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see supra Part III.  Although this 
Note adopts Justice Sotomayor’s evaluation of the Court’s eyewitness jurisprudence, it de-
parts from her approach in a two significant ways.  First, whereas Justice Sotomayor did not 
address whether all suggestive circumstances warrant an application of the due process 
protections, this Note argues they do.  See supra note 184.  Second, this Note argues for a 
revised due process framework that completely abandons the current measures of reliabil-
ity.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 200.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 201.  See infra Part IV.B.1.; see also supra Part II.C.  
 202.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
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A.  Because of Its Misguided Focus on Police Arrangement, the Perry 
Court Mistakenly Identified Deterrence as a Primary Aim of Due 
Process 
The majority erred in its conclusion that deterrence is a primary 
aim of the due process constraint.203  Due process protections arose 
not out of the Court’s concern with deterring police arrangement, 
but rather out of the Court’s concern with ensuring the reliability of 
an eyewitness’s identification.204  In reaching its conclusion, the ma-
jority incorrectly interpreted the Court’s eyewitness identification ju-
risprudence and incorrectly relied upon the fact that the cases com-
prising this jurisprudence involved police arrangement.205  Although 
the Court’s eyewitness identification jurisprudence reflected a con-
cern about the “corrupting effect[s]” of suggestion on reliability,206 
the majority’s decision narrowed the focus to police-arranged sugges-
tive circumstances.207  The majority also placed too much emphasis on 
the fact that these cases involved police arrangement, for it failed to 
recognize that this merely reflects a practical fact of criminal proceed-
ings.208 
The Supreme Court has consistently recognized that the underly-
ing concern of due process, first introduced in Stovall, is the Court’s 
interest in ensuring the reliability of eyewitness identifications.209  
                                                          
 203.  See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 726 (majority opinion) (finding that “[a] primary aim of ex-
cluding identification evidence . . . is to deter law enforcement”). 
 204.  Id. at 735 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). 
 205.  See id. at 721, 725–27 (majority opinion) (noting that previous decisions focused 
on the presence of state action, disagreeing with the contention that the presence of po-
lice action in prior cases was mere coincidence, and arguing that a primary aim of exclu-
sion was deterrence of improper police conduct). 
 206.  Id. at 735 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (alteration in original). 
 207.  Id. at 731. 
 208.  See id. at 735 (“The vast majority of eyewitness identifications . . . use[d] in crimi-
nal prosecutions are obtained in lineup, showup, and photograph displays arranged by the 
police.”). 
 209.  See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301–302 (1967) (recognizing that due process 
may be violated when a confrontation was so suggestive that it led to a likely mistaken 
identification); Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 111–12 (1977) (noting that “[t]he driv-
ing force behind . . . Stovall . . . was the Court’s concern with the problems of eyewitness 
identification”); Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972) (explaining that “[i]t is . . . ap-
parent that the primary evil to be avoided is a very substantial likelihood of irreparable 
misidentification” (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
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Stovall, according to the Court’s subsequent evaluation in Brathwaite, 
reflected the Court’s concern that jurors not hear eyewitness testimo-
ny when such testimony lacks reliability.210  Likewise, in Biggers, the 
Court identified “the primary evil to be avoided,” as the increased 
“likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”211  As the Biggers Court 
explained, “[i]t is the likelihood of misidentification which violates a 
defendant’s right to due process.”212  Furthermore, it is on this basis 
that the Court excluded, for the first and only time, the proposed 
eyewitness testimony in Foster.213  Finally, in its most recent eyewitness-
related decision prior to Perry, the Court concluded that “reliability is 
the linchpin in determining the admissibility of identification testi-
mony.”214 
In other words, the Court’s due process concern lies in the ef-
fects suggestion may have on the reliability of an eyewitness’s identifi-
cation.215  The majority, however, recast this interest by claiming that 
a primary concern of the Court lies in the source, rather than the ef-
fect, of the suggestion.216  In concluding that deterrence is a funda-
mental aim of due process protections, the Perry Court misinterpreted 
Brathwaite, Coleman, and Wade.217  The majority’s reliance on Brathwaite 
to support its contention that deterrence is a primary aim of the due 
process constraint is inappropriate, for the Court only discussed de-
terrence in this instance “because Brathwaite challenged [the 
Court’s] two-step inquiry as lacking deterrence value.”218  Further-
more, the Brathwaite Court only listed deterrence as the “second fac-
                                                          
 210.  Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 111–12. 
 211.  Biggers, 409 U.S. 198. 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  Id.; see Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 737 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (recognizing that “Foster is 
the only case in which [the Court has] found a due process violation”). 
 214.  Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 114 (emphasis added). 
 215.  Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 732.  
 216.  Id. at 731.  If the source of the suggestion is not law enforcement, no deterrable 
conduct took place; law enforcement officers cannot prevent something from occurring 
when it is outside of their control.  Therefore, if deterrence is a “primary aim,” as the ma-
jority argued, the source of the suggestion must be law enforcement.  See id. at 726 (major-
ity opinion) (“A primary aim of excluding identification evidence obtained under unnec-
essarily suggestive circumstances . . . is to deter law enforcement . . . .”). 
 217.  See id. at 725–27 (interpreting these three cases).  
 218.  Id.  at 726, 736 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 111–12. 
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tor.”219  As Justice Sotomayor pointed out, this language neither indi-
cates that deterrence is a “primary aim” of the constraint, nor suggests 
that deterrence is absolutely essential to the Brathwaite  holding.220 
The majority also incorrectly reasoned that no due process viola-
tion occurred in Coleman “because nothing ‘the police said or did 
prompted’” the identification.221  As Justice Sotomayor pointed out, 
the majority took this language out of context, for it was originally 
used to further the contention that the witness’s identification was re-
liable.222  No due process violation occurred in Coleman because the 
“identifications were entirely based upon observations at the time of 
the assault,” not merely because there was an absence of suggestive 
police conduct in arranging the lineup.223  Furthermore, the majori-
ty’s interpretation of this case conflicts with its earlier assessment of 
Coleman in Biggers.  The Biggers Court explained that the witness’s 
identification was admissible in Coleman because the “evidence could 
support a finding that the in-court identification was ‘entirely based 
upon observations at the time of the assault.’”224 
Lastly, the majority incorrectly concluded that “the risk of police 
rigging was the very danger to which the” Wade Court was responding 
when it recognized a right to counsel during lineup procedures.225  
To the contrary, the Wade Court fashioned an exclusionary rule to 
minimize the potential that a conviction would rest upon a misidenti-
fication.226  The majority’s reading of Wade also conflicts with the 
                                                          
 219.  Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 112. 
 220.  Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 736. 
 221.  See id. at 726 (majority opinion) (quoting Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 6 
(1970)) (explaining the rationale behind the Coleman decision).   
 222.  Id. at 736 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); see also Coleman, 399 U.S. at 5–6 (explaining 
that the defendant’s claim that the identification was unreliable as a result of unnecessarily 
suggestive police procedures had no merit because the procedures used were not sugges-
tive). 
 223.  Coleman, 399 U.S. at 5–6. 
 224.  Biggers. 409 U.S. at 197–98 (quoting Coleman, 399 U.S. at 5–6).   
 225.  See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 726–27 (majority opinion) (discussing the Wade rationale). 
 226.  See Stovall, 388 U.S. at 297 (“A conviction which rests on a mistaken identification 
is a gross miscarriage of justice.  The Wade . . . rule[ is] aimed at minimizing that possibil-
ity . . . .”).  
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Brathwaite Court’s prior assessment of the case, since that Court ex-
plained how concerns of reliability drove the decision in Wade.227 
Aside from its improper reading of previous Supreme Court cas-
es, the majority incorrectly relied upon the fact that there are no in-
stances in its eyewitness jurisprudence where suggestion was caused by 
anyone other than law enforcement.228  While true, the Court in its 
previous due process cases was concerned not with the sources of sug-
gestive conduct, but rather with the effects of this conduct on reliabil-
ity.229  Police arrangement was discussed in the earlier cases simply 
because police conduct was present in some form.230  Moreover, con-
sidering that there have only been a handful of Supreme Court cases 
involving due process protections, it is unsurprising that this handful 
of cases involved police arrangement.231  Of the thousands of eyewit-
ness identifications the State seeks to introduce each year, “[t]he vast 
majority . . . are obtained [through identification procedures] ar-
ranged by the police.”232  The majority failed to recognize this practi-
cal fact and, therefore, erred in holding that the source, rather than 
the effect, of suggestion drove the result in these cases. 
B.  In the Face of Significant Scientific Criticism of Due Process, the  
Perry Court Should Have Revised the Current Measures of Reliability 
and Included All Suggestive Circumstances Within the Scope of the 
Constraint 
In reaching its conclusion, the majority relied on the same out-
moded test that the Court promulgated nearly forty years ago in Big-
gers.233  Given that the current framework has been the subject of 
longstanding scientific criticism, however, the Court should have 
                                                          
 227.  See Brathwaite, 432 U.S. at 112 (“Wade and its companion cases reflect the concern 
that the jury not hear eyewitness testimony unless that evidence has aspects of reliability.”). 
 228.  See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 721, n.1 (noting that the Court had never required pretrial 
screening absent police involvement). 
 229.  See id. at 731 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“Our due process concern . . . arises not 
from the act of suggestion, but rather from the corrosive effects of suggestion on the relia-
bility of the resulting identification.”). 
 230.  See supra Part II.A. 
 231.  See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 735 (discussing the “practical reality” that police are often 
involved in obtaining identifications). 
 232.  Id. 
 233.  Id. at 724 (majority opinion). 
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reevaluated this framework.234  Much like the New Jersey Supreme 
Court, the majority should have redefined the manner in which it 
evaluates reliability.235  Moreover, to ensure reliability of eyewitness 
evidence, the Perry Court should have adopted a broader approach 
than that of New Jersey by including all suggestive circumstances with-
in the scope of the revised due process constraint.236 
1.  Similar to the New Jersey Supreme Court, the Perry Court Should 
Have Redefined Its Current Measures of Reliability 
Rather than continuing to rely upon the same due process 
framework, the Court should have reconsidered, in light of longstand-
ing scientific criticism, the manner in which it evaluates the reliability 
of eyewitness identification.  That is, the Court should have adopted 
the system and estimator variables outlined in Henderson,237 rather 
than continue to use the five factors outlined in Biggers.238  Although 
the due process concern lies in ensuring reliability of eyewitness tes-
timony, the Court has remained stagnant by continuing to use an ap-
proach that does not adequately measure reliability. 
As the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized in Henderson, eye-
witness identifications are perhaps the most unreliable form of evi-
dence used in criminal trials.239  This assertion is supported, the court 
explained, by the relationship between misidentifications and wrong-
ful convictions.240  For example, of the defendants who have been ex-
onerated on the basis of post-conviction DNA analysis, nearly seventy-
five percent were identified by an eyewitness.241  Astonishingly, in 
                                                          
 234.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 235.  See infra Part IV.B.1.  The scientific literature referenced in Henderson is sufficient 
for revising the due process constraint and therefore the Court does not need to conduct 
any additional research.  Nearly all of the scientific literature referenced in this Note was 
discussed by Henderson. 
 236.  See infra Part IV.B.2. 
 237.  New Jersey v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 896–911 (N.J. 2011).  
 238.  Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199–200 (1972). 
 239.  Henderson, 27 A.3d at 885–86. 
 240.  Id. 
 241.  Id. at 886; see also GARRETT, supra note 23, at 48 (noting that 190 of 250 exonerees 
were misidentified by a witness).  Defendants were either directly identified as being the 
assailant, or were said to have been in the vicinity when the crime occurred.  Id. at 51.  The 
majority of the exonerees in this particular study were convicted of rape.  Id. 
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some instances, several witnesses independently misidentified these 
defendants.242 
The Henderson court recognized that eyewitness memory is not 
like a videotape that can be “replay[ed]” inside the witness’s head, but 
rather is “a constructive, dynamic, and selective process.”243  The wit-
ness’s memory is affected by variables that may decrease the reliability 
of an identification.244  The variables, which may affect the witness’s 
memory and therefore the reliability of her identification, are divided 
into two subcategories: system variables and estimator variables.245 
System variables, which are within the control of law enforce-
ment, include whether the identification procedure was administered 
in a blind fashion, the content and existence of pre-identification in-
structions, the construction of the lineup, whether the witness was 
given any confirmatory feedback, whether the eyewitness had multiple 
opportunities to view the defendant during the course of the investi-
gation, whether the individuals comprising the lineup were viewed 
sequentially or simultaneously, whether the police used composite 
sketches to produce an image of the suspect, and whether the police 
facilitated a one-man showup.246  Take, for example, whether police 
conducted a pretrial lineup procedure in a blind fashion, that is, 
whether the officer conducting the pretrial lineup knew which indi-
vidual in the lineup was the primary suspect.  “[B]y consciously or un-
consciously communicating to [a] witness[] which lineup member is 
the suspect,” an officer may influence the witness’s response.247  “Even 
seemingly innocuous words and subtle cues—-pauses, gestures, hesita-
                                                          
 242.  GARRETT, supra note 23, at 50.  This was the case in nearly forty percent of the ex-
onerees studied.  Id.; see also Bloodsworth v. State, 76 Md. App. 23, 55, 543 A.2d 382, 398 
(1988) (explaining that the defendant was identified by five eyewitnesses); Christine E. 
White, Comment, Clearly Erroneous: The Court of Appeals of Maryland’s Misguided Shift to a 
Higher Standard for Post-Conviction Relief, 71 MD. L. REV. 886, 886–87 (2012) (noting that 
Bloodsworth was exonerated on the basis of DNA testing). 
 243.  Henderson, 27 A.3d at 895; see also GARRETT, supra note 23, at 48 (“[E]yewitness 
memory is not just fallible; more important, it is malleable.”). 
 244.  Henderson, 27 A.3d at 895. 
 245.  Id. 
 246.  Id. at 896–900.  The list of system variables provided by the court is non-
exhaustive.  Id. at 920.  
 247.  Sarah M. Greathouse & Margaret Bull Kovera, Instruction Bias and Lineup Presenta-
tion Moderate the Effects of Administrator Knowledge on Eyewitness Identification, 33 LAW & HUM. 
BEHAV. 70, 71 (2009). 
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tions, or smiles—-can influence a witness’ behavior.”248  What is fur-
ther alarming is that the witness may not even be aware that such sug-
gestion is occurring.249 
Estimator variables, which are outside the control of law en-
forcement, include the witness’s level of stress, whether the criminal 
used a weapon, whether the witness is a different race than the perpe-
trator, and the decay of the witness’s memory over time.250  As an illus-
tration, take the instance of a victim being robbed at gunpoint.  The 
presence of a gun may draw the witness’s attention away from the as-
sailant’s face and onto the gun itself.251  Thus, the presence of a visible 
weapon may decrease the witness’s ability to make a reliable identifi-
cation or provide an accurate description of the assailant.252 
The way witnesses evaluate individuals when making an identifi-
cation may also contribute to the likelihood of misidentification.253  In 
a pretrial lineup, for instance, an eyewitness may use a “relative-
judgment process” when selecting an individual as the perpetrator.254  
That is, the witness will “choose[] the lineup member who most re-
sembles the culprit relative to the other members of the lineup.”255  As a re-
sult of making a relative judgment, the witness may make a positive 
identification, even if the actual perpetrator is absent from the 
lineup.256 
Although the reliability of eyewitness identifications has been 
called into question, it is reasonable to ask why misidentifications are 
                                                          
 248.  Henderson, 27 A.3d at 896. 
 249.  Id. at 896–97. 
 250.  Id. at 904–07. 
 251.  Id. at 904–05. 
 252.  Id. at 905. 
 253.  See, e.g., Gary L. Wells, What Do We Know About Eyewitness Identification?, 48 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 553, 560–61 (1993) [hereinafter Wells, Eyewitness Identification] (referenc-
ing studies that suggest that human cognitive processes operate differently when identify-
ing individuals from photographs or lineups).  
 254.  Id. at 560.  
 255.  Id.  
 256.  Id.  In a study conducted by Professor Wells, 200 individuals viewed a staged crime.  
Id. at 561.  One half of the participants were shown a lineup containing the criminal; the 
second half were shown a lineup containing all innocent fillers.  Id.  Even though both 
groups were told that the criminal might not be present in the lineup, nearly seventy per-
cent of the individuals in the second group identified an innocent filler as the criminal.  
Id. 
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a problem given that a false identification itself does not necessarily 
result in conviction.257  False identifications alone do not raise a con-
cern about miscarriages of justice, “but rather [it is] the certainty with 
which such false identifications are sometimes made.”258  The wit-
ness’s level of certainty raises a concern because, when considering 
whether or not to believe a witness, jurors rely heavily on the level of 
confidence with which the witness gives her testimony.259  Further-
more, “there is considerable evidence that false identifications are of-
ten asserted with as much confidence as are accurate identifica-
tions,”260 and certainty, like memory, is malleable.261 
The danger of miscarriage of justice resulting from a misidentifi-
cation is further compounded by the fact that jurors often hold be-
liefs about memory that are, in fact, contrary to scientific literature.262  
For example, many might believe that a victim to an armed robbery 
would never forget what the assailant, who held the gun to her head, 
looked like.263  As noted above, however, reliability is affected adverse-
ly by both stress and the presence of a visible weapon.264 
Under the current due process test, lower federal and state 
courts are to evaluate reliability by looking to five factors: (1) the op-
portunity to view the criminal, (2) the witness’s level of attention, (3) 
the accuracy of the description given by the witness, (4) the witness’s 
level of certainty, and (5) the lapse of time between the crime and the 
identification.265  This test, however, “is deeply flawed . . . [for] it also 
includes some factors that do not actually” measure reliability.266  For 
instance, 
three of those factors—the opportunity to view the crime, 
the witness’ degree of attention, and the level of certainty at 
                                                          
 257.  See Gary L. Wells, The Psychology of Lineup Identifications, 14 J. APPLIED SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 89, 90 (1984) [hereinafter Wells, Lineup Identifications] (“It is important . . . to 
keep in mind that a false identification does not automatically convict anyone.”). 
 258.  Wells, Eyewitness Identification, supra note 253, at 564 (citation omitted). 
 259.  Wells, Lineup Identifications, supra note 257, at 91. 
 260.  Id. 
 261.  Wells, Eyewitness Identification, supra note 253, at 565. 
 262.  Id.  
 263.  See id. (noting the common belief that those who experience traumatic situations 
“never forget a face” because of their focus on the incident). 
 264.  See supra text accompanying notes 250–252. 
 265.  Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 199–200 (1972). 
 266.  GARRETT, supra note 23, at 63. 
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the time of the identification—rely on self-reporting by eye-
witnesses; and research has shown that those reports can be 
skewed by the suggestive procedures themselves and thus 
may not be reliable.267 
Recognizing the inadequacy of the current due process frame-
work as a measure of reliability, the Henderson court proposed a new 
framework that would examine system and estimator variables when 
gauging reliability.268  Rather than assess reliability on the basis of the 
five Biggers factors, the Henderson court explained that all relevant sys-
tem and estimator variables should be considered when there is evi-
dence of suggestion.269 
The reason why the Supreme Court should have abandoned the 
current measures of reliability in favor of the system and estimator 
variables outlined by the Henderson court is simple.  Due process pro-
tections arose out of the Court’s concern with ensuring reliability,270 
and the current Biggers factors inadequately ensure that an eyewit-
ness’s identification testimony is reliable.271  Furthermore, evaluating 
the reliability of a potential eyewitness on the basis of the system and 
estimator variables outlined by the Henderson court reflects recent de-
velopments in social science and is a more reliable method by which 
to guarantee reliability.272  In the face of nearly thirty years of scien-
tific literature, the Court should have redeveloped its due process 
framework by using factors that better gauge reliability and aban-
doned the outmoded measures of reliability it now uses. 
2.  To Adequately Ensure That Eyewitness Identifications Are 
Reliable, the Perry Court Should Have Included All Suggestive 
Circumstances Within the Scope of Due Process 
In addition to overhauling the measures of reliability, the Court 
should have included all suggestive circumstances within the scope of 
                                                          
 267.  State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 918 (2011). 
 268.  Id. at 919. 
 269.  Id.  For a defendant to be entitled to a pretrial determination of an identification’s 
reliability, however, the evidence of suggestion must usually be tied to a system variable.  
Id. at 920. 
 270.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 271.  Henderson, 27 A.3d at 918.   
 272.  See id. at 922 (advocating that courts consider variables relating to eyewitness iden-
tifications that are generally accepted by the scientific community, and asserting that the 
new framework will better protect the right to a fair trial). 
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the due process constraint.  In this regard, the Henderson court did 
not go far enough.273  All suggestive circumstances, whether they are 
related to a system or estimator variable, have the potential to adverse-
ly affect the reliability of an eyewitness identification.274  Put different-
ly, the effects of suggestion are the same irrespective of whom or what 
caused the suggestion.275  The Perry Court and the Henderson court, 
however, restricted the potential application of the due process con-
straint to instances where the police caused the suggestion.276  There-
fore, under either approach, a court will never need to consider 
whether the effects of suggestive circumstances, which are tied solely 
to estimator variables, warrant an application of the due process pro-
tections. 
To restrict the scope of the due process constraint in this manner 
is to rely heavily upon the ability of the jury to weigh the reliability of 
an eyewitness’s testimony.277  Jurors, however, are largely unaware of 
how estimator variables actually affect the reliability of an eyewitness’s 
testimony.278  What is perhaps worse is that they often hold views that 
are contrary to scientific findings.279  Jurors, simply put, place too 
much faith in eyewitness testimony, especially when that eyewitness is 
confident in her assertions.280 
                                                          
 273.  The Henderson approach requires suggestiveness related to police conduct to trig-
ger the due process constraint.  See id. at 920 (allowing for a pretrial hearing when a system 
variable is implicated).  That is, if a suggestive circumstance is only suggestive as a result of 
estimator variables, which are out of law enforcement’s control, the court will not apply 
due process. Id.  
 274.  Id. at 922. 
 275.  Id. 
 276.  Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 730 (2012); State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 
872, 920 (2011).  The Perry Court additionally seemed to suggest that the police conduct 
must be intentionally suggestive.  See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 734 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) 
(noting that the “police-arranged” requirement “connote[s] a degree of intentional or-
chestration or manipulation”). 
 277.  See Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 728 (majority opinion) (explaining that the Court’s ap-
proach relies heavily upon the role of jurors to weigh eyewitness testimony); Henderson, 27 
A.3d at 923 (finding that jury instructions are sufficient in instances where the suggestion 
is tied solely to estimator variables). 
 278.  See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 910 (internal quotation marks omitted) (finding “that 
laypersons are largely unfamiliar with scientific findings). 
 279.  Id. 
 280.  See supra notes 259–261 and accompanying text; Wells, Lineup Identifications, supra 
note 257, at 91 (noting that an eyewitness’s confidence is the “primary predictor” of 
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The Perry Court cited to “procedural safeguards,” such as the 
Sixth Amendment right to confront adverse witnesses, as a way to en-
sure that jurors properly weigh the reliability of eyewitness testimo-
ny.281  Such an argument, however, cannot stand; of the nearly two 
hundred exonerees misidentified by a witness, “defense lawyers typi-
cally did cross-examine eyewitnesses, often aggressively.”282  In defense 
of its approach, the Henderson court suggested that revised jury in-
structions are sufficient to instruct jurors on how to properly weigh 
eyewitness testimony when that testimony has been subject to sugges-
tion tied only to an estimator variable.283  Much like the Supreme 
Court’s reliance on procedural safeguards,284 any reliance on jury in-
structions, no matter how informative, is misguided.285  Jurors place 
too much faith in the confident eyewitness; are generally unaware of 
how suggestion affects reliability; and have perceptions that are large-
ly unaffected by either procedural safeguards, such as cross-
examinations or jury instructions.286  Therefore, allowing suggestive 
eyewitness identification to be introduced at trial because police ar-
rangement is nonexistent is contrary to the very foundation of due 
process.287 
V.  CONCLUSION 
In Perry v. New Hampshire, the Court concluded that courts are 
not required, under the Due Process Clause, to conduct pretrial in-
                                                          
whether jurors will believe her); Wells, Eyewitness Identification, supra note 253, at 564 
(same). 
 281.  Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 728. 
 282.  GARRETT, supra note 23, at 48, 54. 
 283.  See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 923, 925–26 (finding that jury instructions, not pretrial 
hearings, were appropriate when estimator variables were involved, and asking that the 
drafters of revised jury instructions consider both system and estimator variables). 
 284.  See supra note 294 and accompanying text. 
 285.  See Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 356 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“To 
expect a jury to engage in the collective mental gymnastic of segregating and ignoring 
such [identification] testimony upon instruction is utterly unrealistic.”); BRIAN L. CUTLER 
& STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEWITNESS, PSYCHOLOGY, AND THE 
LAW 263–64 (1995) (noting that there is little support for the contention that a judge’s 
instructions concerning the reliability of an eyewitness’s testimony will aid jurors in weigh-
ing such evidence, and that such instructions do not effectively prevent misidentification). 
 286.  See supra notes 278–280, 282, 285 and accompanying text.  
 287.  See supra Part IV.A. 
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quiries into the reliability of eyewitness identifications made under 
suggestive circumstances not arranged by law enforcement.288  The 
Court’s determination that deterrence was a fundamental aim of the 
due process constraint was a consequence of the Court’s misguided 
focus on the presence of suggestive, police-arranged procedures in its 
eyewitness identification jurisprudence.289  The majority failed to rec-
ognize that the constraint arose out of the Court’s concern with the 
reliability of eyewitness identifications and that police arrangement of 
the identification procedure—present in its eyewitness identification 
jurisprudence as a result of practical realities—was only discussed in-
sofar as it affected reliability.290  Aside from avoiding this error in in-
terpretation, the Court should have revised the due process frame-
work to better measure reliability and recognized that the due process 
constraint ought to apply in all suggestive circumstances.291 
 
                                                          
 288.  Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 730 (2011). 
 289.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 290.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 291.  See supra Part IV.B. 
